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Summary 
How do reflexive political forms within organizations and the design of innovation processes 
co-evolve? This paper focuses on emerging reflexive forms of power and authority, 
considered as regimes beyond pure domination (Clegg et al. 2006: 330 f.). We assume that 
preserving freedom and initiative of individuals, while not undermining the power of 
organizational top elites, is particularly essential for business success of organisations 
operating in high-tech, innovative sectors. Up to now, however, neither the development of 
related political forms within organisations, nor their intertwinements with innovation 
processes have been very well understood. Therefore this paper studies the linkages between 
innovation processes and reflexive political forms of organizations. More specifically, the 
paper aims to explore in detail the contested, antagonistic and paradoxical processes an 
organisation must undertake in designing a reflexive political form, a “political hybrid” 
(Clegg et al. 2006: 333), conducive to innovation capabilities and innovation processes in 
high-tech companies. Theoretical reasoning is underlined by first insights from a longitudinal 
case study, being part of a comparative case study program, focusing on the co-evolution of 
political forms and innovation process design in a SME in southern Germany. 
The paper contributes to the debate on power and innovation in several respects. First, we will 
propose a dynamic approach to exploring change and development of political forms within 
organisations. Most of the literature concerned with different political forms and political 
regimes within organisations is still centred on static typologies and its comparison (Clegg et 
al. 2006: 332). Second, we will examine the often neglected, contradictory processes shaping 
hybrid political forms in organisations. Third, we will conceptually and empirically explore 
linkages between innovation processes and emerging political hybrids within organizations. 
This study is,  to the best of our knowledge, a research desideratum both in the literature on 
power and the literature on innovation processes (e.g. Hage and Meeus 2006; Poole and Van 
De Ven 2004; Vigoda-Gadot and Drory 2006; Clegg et al. 2006).  
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The Issues of Power, Reflexivity and Innovation  
Our concern with the co-evolution of reflexive kinds of power/authority and innovation 
originates from the debate on dynamic capabilities (Teece et al. 1997; Zollo and Winter 2002; 
Moldaschl 2006; Schreyögg and Kliesch-Eberl 2007). Hence, in this paper we are not 
concerned with reflexivity as means of organization research itself (e.g. Weick 1999; 
Alvesson et al. 2004).  
In short, dynamic capabilities are conceived of as prerequisite for innovation, as means of 
overcoming potential rigidities of previous organizational capability building and innovation 
(e.g. capability traps, lock-ins, etc.; Leonard-Barton 1992; Burgelman 2002). The current 
debate on dynamic capabilities, however, shows that the concept suffers from inherent 
contradictions, running the risk of dissolving the original idea and the strength of 
organizational capability building. In particular, it is debated how dynamic capabilities really 
can be (Schreyögg and Kliesch-Eberl 2007). 
Regarding this debate, with respect to our research perspective, the main points here are the 
focus on capability monitoring, on second order observation processes and on reflexivity. 
These are considered core means to preserve the innovation capability of organisations 
(Moldaschl 2006; Schreyögg and Kliesch-Eberl 2007). Second-order observation is seen as a 
means to put the framing of first-order practices into perspective (Giddens 1984; 
Antonacopoulou and Tsoukas 2002). And it is seen as a means to reflect upon the specific 
links between the theories-in-use (Argyris and Schön 1978) and the specific use of various 
resources that make for capability formation. Second-order observation is not considered as 
part of first-order acting-practice. Through second-order observation, the organization takes 
time out for a moment, reflecting on the reasons for a specific way of doing something. Our 
understanding of reflexivity is closely linked with this theoretical context. In particular, any 
means fostering deliberate, rule based (i.e., institutionalized) monitoring and critiquing of 
organizational first order routines and practices are considered as means of reflexivity 
(Moldaschl 2006). Scorecards, roundtables and reporting practices, surveys, after-action-
reviews, OD-consulting, open-innovation practices and so forth, are considered as 
instruments, rules and practices of reflexivity. They supposedly foster reflexive forms of 
power and authority within innovative organizations.  
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The political character of second-order observation is principally acknowledged in the related 
literature. Reflexivity is seen as subject to political manoeuvring and resistance, embedded in 
power structures that potentially ensure or weaken such reflexivity. However, a fundamental 
political perspective on second order observation, conceiving of reflexivity and innovation as 
being embedded in political regimes within organisations, particularly a focus on their co-
evolution, is missing.  
Our study sets out to deal with this research gap. To do so, we take a ‘political regime 
perspective’, in order to study the co-evolution of political forms enhancing reflexivity within 
organisations and the designing of innovation processes preserving the innovation capability 
in the long run. 
The Regime Perspective 
A regime perspective connects power with the social fabric of various organisational forms, 
acknowledging that concrete modes of rule will be in struggle with each other and no ‘one 
best way’ of implementing a political structure exists (neither in terms of content nor process) 
(Clegg et al. 2006: 331). A regime perspective stresses the hybrid character of organisational 
power structures, which are considered here as polyarchic systems (Clegg et al. 2006: 331). In 
short, polyarchy constitutes political structures offering space to a great diversity of actors, 
while not disrupting the power of organisational elites (e.g. owners, top managers etc.) and 
their right to govern. Polyarchic political forms combine different natures and cultures of 
power, e.g. bureaucratic and professional. In line with this reasoning, we consider the focus 
on evolving polyarchic political systems to be an appropriate starting point for a better 
understanding of reflexivity and innovation.  
Reflexivity, as a prerequisite for innovation, is considered to be ‘planned irritation’ of extant 
organisational practices. In terms of political regime analysis, this means encouraging actors 
to take the role of legitimate adversaries, thereby strengthening their role as corporate sub-
elites in decentralized, knowledge intensive, innovative organisations. However, legitimate 
adversaries and their relations need to be ordered symbolically and structurally within (and 
across) organisations, in order to preserve the right of top elites to govern. Assuming there is 
no one best way (or pure type) of organizational political form, focussing on polyarchic 
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systems and its co-evolution with reflexivity and innovation again appears as a promising 
avenue for research.  
Process Characteristics of Regime Evolution  
Regarding the co-evolution of polyarchic forms, reflexivity, and innovation within organis-
ations, we are specifically interested in the processes that make for this co-evolution. We 
suggest considering and studying three variables (or dimensions) as key characteristics of 
these processes: 
1. the contested character 
2. the paradoxical character  
3. the designed character. 
1 The contested character: Even the mainstream literature on innovation and dynamic 
capabilities acknowledges the contested character of capability development and innovation 
(e.g. Frost and Egri 1991; Kanter 1983; 2001; Burgelman 2002; Markham 2000; Schreyögg 
and Kliesch-Eberl 2007), notwithstanding the predominantly functional conceptions of power 
and the focus on champions of innovation. In short, innovators need power to overcome 
resistance against innovation, in order to put day-to-day activities into perspective, to call into 
question the theories-in-use, to legitimize one’s own projects and de-legitimize the claims of 
rival projects in the innovation game. Consequently, we assume that changing the ‘meta-
rules’ of second order observation and innovation games (in our perspective: changing parts 
of the organisational political regime) will also be subject to contest and political 
manoeuvring, as meta-rules itself are to be seen as sources of innovators’ strategic agency.  
When taking a political regime perspective, the co-evolution of reflexivity, innovation 
processes and political regimes within organisations unavoidably appears to be contested 
because organizations principally are conceived of as controversial social constructions. Here, 
“legitimate enemies” (Clegg et al. 2006: 331) and their relationships are constitutive. Hence, a 
focus on the contested character of the co-evolutionary processes we are studying is 
obligatory. Main research questions are: who does what, for what ends? How are conflicts 
dealt with? Which forms of power are prevailing? 
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2 The paradoxical character: A political form conducive to reflexivity and innovation is 
supposed to be self-reflexive, at least to some extent. We believe that developing this form 
proves to be dilemmatic, if not paradoxical. 
Our main argument is that reflexivity will most probably make visible the fabric of 
organisational life. If taken seriously, reflexivity will not stop short of also making visible 
formerly invisible aspects of power practices, particularly when actors become aware of its 
relevance for innovation processes. This will in turn potentially weaken the effectiveness of 
power and the strength of incumbent power holders, since power is most effective in its 
invisible, taken-for-granted forms (soft powers e.g. in soft authoritarian systems) (Courpasson 
2006). Hence, political regimes fostering reflexivity and innovation, regardless of their 
concrete characteristics, run the risk of undermining their political performance.  
Yet, in line with the dynamic capabilities discourse, we argue that reflexivity is a very 
relevant form of fostering innovation. As we conceive of reflexivity as a practice not 
separated from the political character of organisational life, it must be conceived of (and 
managed) as incorporated in the political regime within organisations. Therefore, the 
mentioned paradox arises. We believe that the co-evolution of reflexive political forms and 
innovation practices in business organisations will hinge upon the capacity of actors to handle 
related paradoxes, and a political form/regime that merges the belief in the owners’ right to 
govern (their legitimate authority) with professional and collegial forms of power and 
authority, supplemented with the instrumentation of management systems that allow for 
reflexivity (Moldaschl 2006). Hence, main research questions are: How is the balance kept 
between the elites’ right to govern, and the need to reflect as means of fostering innovation? 
How does the threat of failed innovation influence such balancing processes? Related to this: 
how and by whom is soft power used? How are management instruments and systems used to 
foster reflexivity?  
3 The design(ed) character: In addition to our focus on the contested and paradoxical 
character regarding the evolution of political forms fostering innovation within organisations, 
we propose studying these processes from a scientific “design perspective” (Jelinek et al. 
2008). A scientific design perspective helps to explore how the contradictions and paradoxes 
are practically dealt with. A scientific design perspective is probably more focused on tasks, 
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work processes and workers than the scientific perspective on political forms and regimes. It 
fruitfully supplements our analysis of political regimes evolving within organisations. 
Regarding our research questions, a design perspective helps to focus on the concrete work of 
innovation, on the constituting elements of innovation systems, on the underlying 
“construction principles” (Dougherty 2008) and work design specifications of reflexive 
organisational systems, enabling and constraining innovators’ work and their social and task-
related interdependencies. Focusing on concrete work processes and its construction 
principles will also allow us to discern the deeper meanings, intentions and interests of the 
actors involved, as well as its contradictions and conflicts. Hence, a design perspective 
usefully complements our political perspective. Taking this perspective, main research 
questions are: What are characteristics of the innovation work studied? What are guiding 
design principles of the innovation processes studied? How, by whom and for what ends are 
these characteristics and processes reflected upon when re-designing innovation systems? 
How are practices of designing enabled and constrained by existing political regimes of the 
organisation under study? 
Research Methods and Case Context 
RESEARCH METHODS: Our overarching research program is designed as a comparative 
case study approach (Yin 2003) with several longitudinal cases aimed at exploring the 
conditions, processes and effects of developing more reflexive organizations. Within this 
research program we are still in the first exploratory phase. Thus, the insights presented in this 
paper serve as first assumptions of the field, rather than final results. The case presented here 
is revealing because we have had the opportunity to comparatively study the co-evolution of 
innovation systems and reflexive power forms in this organization. The case may potentially 
serve as a revelatory case (Yin 2003:43): we have gotten, and most probably will continue 
receive, encompassing access to actors, processes and documents of the contested change 
under study. As the processes are both relevant for the competitiveness and political by their 
very nature, they are usually treated as confidential and access for researchers is denied. 
Hence, in terms of data quality, it is of utmost importance to get as open access as possible to 
the political key players in the arena when studying political maneuvering ‘behind the scenes’ 
and the use of different forms of power. So far, starting with a kick-off meeting attended by 
the owners, managers and R&D-professionals, data collection has included 1 individual 
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interview with the owner, 4 group interviews as well as participatory observation of 
laboratory work and of 2 OD workshops conducted by an external consultant (see appendix). 
Additionally, organizational documents particularly referring to innovation projects have been 
analyzed. Data are stored in field notes, memos and contact summary sheets, stenographic 
notes from interviews, photos and maps from workshops and in interaction-process-analysis 
sheets. We have been very cautious so far with “prior instrumentation” (Miles and Huberman 
1994:36) of the research process, putting emphasis on the well-grounding of our concepts, on 
contextual richness (thick descriptions) and close connection with the lived experience of the 
people in our case (Miles and Huberman 1994:34 f.; Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 2003). 
Consequently, data coding and data analysis has been kept very open minded up to now, 
avoiding premature closure of conceptual reasoning and data interpretation. Drawn from our 
basic concepts, we have applied a simple start list of codes, referring to actors’ interests and 
conflicts among them, to potentially contradictory design principles regarding innovation 
processes as well as emerging paradoxes. We have scrutinized and re-ordered our data 
accordingly, so far by hand (see research results, table 2).  
BUSINESS CONTEXT:  The company, TSBT1, is located in Bavaria, a southern part of 
Germany, was founded in 1996 by two individual entrepreneurs. Both founders are still 
owners and managing directors of the company, which has now grown to some 35 employees. 
Until now, TSBT has been operating in a relatively stable business environment, in which all 
fundamental technological specifications are determined by international standards and the 
range of potential customers is clearly delimited. 
Strategic considerations led to attempts to build up a second area of business in order to 
reduce dependency on the extant business domain. Since then TSBT has been striving to 
establish a new area of business within the medicine market, representing a much more 
complex and turbulent field of business. This in turn raises the requirements of innovation 
capability, both in terms of technology and organizational issues. 
                                                 
1 To preserve anonymity, all names are changed and the exact business domain is withheld. 
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HIERARCHY: Until recently the company mainly has been managed on an informal basis. 
There are only a few explicit rules assigning authorizations and responsibilities to particular 
positions or persons, or defining standard approaches to recurring tasks. Formal job 
descriptions, although existing on the paper, have almost no practical relevance.  
 Within the hierarchy, the two managing directors rank first. Most of the employees work at 
the bottom of the hierarchy in R&D, with only a few employees in the production department. 
R&D is organized by projects, each with a project leader and additional support staff, if 
necessary. Additionally, between the top elite level and the project manager level there are 
several other positions which we will refer to as “middle managers”. These managers have 
coordinating functions, rather than the formal authority to govern an area of responsibility on 
their own.  
PROJECT MANAGEMENT: All R&D projects are directly supervised by the managing 
directors in weekly meetings, attended by the relevant project managers and middle managers 
as well as the managing directors. These meetings are intended to keep the top management 
informed about all projects and, if necessary, to make decisions on projects. Neither project 
managers nor middle managers have their own budgets. 
BUSINESS PHILOSOPHY / NEED FOR INNOVATIONS: Top management is very aware 
that technological brilliance alone does not keep the business going. They constantly 
emphasizes that the main focus of product innovation has to be customer needs, as it is the 
customer on whom the company ultimately depends. In their view, the R&D experts are still 
not aware of this market logic, which they feel might emerge as a major problem for the 
market driven innovations needed by now. In addition, producing successful innovations, 
especially in the new and complex market, has turned out to be a demanding challenge, in 
terms of R&D expertise, market expertise and internal organizational structures and 
processes. Agreement has been achieved among the owners, middle managers and R&D 
experts that the existing organizational structures and processes are not appropriate for 
stimulating the innovation output. The company is now facing the challenges of reorganizing 
authority structures, reorganizing the innovation processes and investing in HR-development 
in order to keep the enterprise under control of the owners during further growth, while still 
providing space for creativity and innovation. While all actors are aware of the need to re-
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design the organizational structure, hitherto no consent has been reached about the final 
organizational design that could serve as an ultimate vision for the change process. The 
owners consider R&D experts still not having the necessary business acumen and therefore 
see their training in suitable methods (innovation methods, project assessment, etc.) as an 
essential prerequisite for further changes in authority structures. Middle managers and project 
managers, however, regard a revision of task and responsibility assignments as the most 
pressing issue, which is in turn refused by top management. 
Research Results 
a) The old political form as point of departure 
As we are especially interested in the evolution of a political form, we will first reflect on its 
“original” characteristics in order to obtain a point of departure with which further evolutions 
can be contrasted. 
Clegg et al. (2006: 334) suggest a typology of political forms based on five dimensions, 
which we apply as a guideline for our analysis. Our findings show that the old political form 
which has been prevalent at TSBT has strong paternalistic characteristics. Of course, there are 
indications that do not match with the ideal type of “patriarchy” (e.g. the existence of middle 
management positions, as they are an element, which does not fit in the logic of exclusive 
power concentration). However, many of these indications can be seen as first steps of an 
evolutionary process towards a more democratic political form. 
FEW FORMAL RULES: The absence of almost any formal rules has led to a very central, 
therewith strong position of the organizational top elite. Even though all major issues on R&D 
projects are discussed among the relevant actors in the weekly project meetings, the ultimate 
power of decision is held by the managing directors. The implicit agreement between the 
organizational top elite and the subordinates, from which this distribution of power has drawn 
its legitimacy for about a decade, is that the managing directors are in charge of strategic 
decision making while the project managers focus on their operational work. In return, the 
managing directors are responsible for reliable and good decisions, which are the basis for 
business success and thus for safe jobs. In short, this has been the mode of operation until 
now. 
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The nature of authority in the extant political regime is deeply vested in the two managing 
directors and based on two pillars. On one hand their authority is based on their position as 
company owners. There is a strong awareness among all employees that the owners are 
bearing the business risks. On the other hand, the authority is based on the owner’s business 
expertise, which has led to constant business growth so far. In line with this, the owners’ 
hierarchical status has not been subject to any discussion. However, within the group of 
project leaders and even between project managers and middle managers, hierarchical 
differences are hardly noticeable. 
Nature of 
authority 
• Vested in individuals 
• Based on ownership and business expertise 
Type of 
hierarchy 
• Strong vertical hierarchy between top management and employees 
• Collegiality among employees 
Decision-
making 
process 
• Dominated by top elite 
• Focused on practical problem solving 
 
Core values • “Just do your job” 
• Loyalty to the owners  
 
Nature of 
social control 
• Direct control 
Table 1: Paternalistic political form 
Summing up, the present political form can be characterized as a paternalistic form, with the 
entrepreneurs as central power holders. Clegg et al. (2006) put up a continuum of political 
forms, reaching from rational-based bureaucracy as an oligarchic political form, to collectivist 
democracy as a democratic one. We would suggest that the paternalistic form depicted here 
falls into the oligarchic range of this continuum, maybe even left of the rational-based 
bureaucracy. 
b) New challenges for the extant political form 
This simple, yet effective distribution of power has been working well as long as the number 
of employees was not too high and TSBT operated a in a relatively stable environment. On 
one hand the involvement of the owners in all R&D projects ensured that the projects are 
strictly aligned with the business needs. On the other hand, all decisions on the projects are 
highly dependent on the knowledge and intuition of a few individuals. However, the R&D 
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professionals unequivocally perceive the owners as being authoritarian when making 
decisions about promising future research fields, highlighting the contested character of the 
company’s political regime. 
Now, as the company is growing and deliberately moving into a more complex and unstable 
environment by making use of its own resources in order to produce innovative products, the 
actors become more and more aware of the prerequisites and shortcomings of the extant 
political practices (the “political form” in scientific terms). When taking the regime-based 
research perspective, the occurring problems appear to be intertwined with and can be 
interpreted as directly related to the political form. In daily working life it is merely their 
concrete aspects which prominently stand out. 
On one hand, the growth in the number of employees in combination with top management’s 
central position simply takes a bottleneck effect on decision making processes and internal 
workflows. On the other hand, the complex and partly “unreadable” character of the medicine 
market and its development is rendering an orientation towards a more reflexive, flexible and 
self-managing innovation system, as means of coming to terms with the fundamental 
uncertainties in this business field (reflexivity in terms of second order observation, 
Moldaschl 2006; Schreyögg and Kliesch-Eberl 2007). One of the most pressing questions 
concerns the fuzzy front-end-stage of innovation processes (i.e. which of the more or less 
inchoate projects or project ideas within the human medicine domain are most promising and 
therefore should be promoted most). According to their self-assessment, neither the owners 
nor the other employees, including R&D professionals, have sufficient individual market 
expertise to decide this on a well-founded basis. The traditional decision making model, based 
on the expertise of individual actors, shows glaring deficiencies at this point. 
In principle, these insights are accepted among key players in the company. However, there is 
neither a shared understanding of the full range of the problems nor a shared understanding of 
the measures to take. The problems emerging from the improper organizational structures are 
perceived in different ways by different actors.  
One prominent concrete measure was a workshop, aiming at getting an independent 
evaluation of current project ideas by external consultants. In terms of our perspective on 
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reflexivity (Moldaschl 2006), this workshop gives a good example of institutionalized 
reflexivity, namely the deliberate utilization of third-party observation. 
The owners are well aware that such institutionalized evaluation by external experts alone will 
not be sufficient for a general change of the innovation system and that a fundamental 
enhancement of innovation capability will require fundamental changes of organizational 
roles. Their long-term goal is to strengthen the role of project managers, i.e. providing them 
with both more autonomy and more responsibility on their projects. 
According to many statements, this is a wholehearted change goal. It substantially challenges 
vested interests and the nature and culture of power, paving the way for legitimating and 
empowering a new corporate sub-elite who will most probably be more alleged to 
professional norms and rationalities than the current dominant elite. But as the envisioned 
entrepreneurial role(s) is (are) supposed to be regulated by rules, the owners seemingly 
inevitably run into the central power paradox rooted in “ruling by rule” (Clegg et al. 2006). 
The managing directors are very suspicious of the project leader’s entrepreneurial mind 
because they regard them as not being accustomed to think in terms of business needs, 
customer needs and market needs, but rather in terms of technology. 
It appears that the “regulation of identity” (Alvesson and Willmott 2002), the constitution of 
subjects who are both creative and obedient, i.e. the self-disciplined organizationally useful 
intrapreneur, is a major challenge for implementing a more reflexive political form. The 
managing directors seem to be aware of that, currently denying the coming intrapreneurs any 
budget control. From the perspective of the project managers the implicit signal seems 
somehow ambiguous. On one hand, top management propagates the ideal of an internal 
entrepreneur who is responsible (and held accountable) for his projects. On the other hand, the 
corresponding authorizations in terms of resource control and decision rights are constantly 
denied. Reframed in psychological terms, the actors appear to be entrapped in a double-bind 
situation. 
However, moving into the medicine market will require the further involvement of  R&D 
professionals into decision making in order to ensure their commitment. Thus, the fate of the 
company is becoming more dependent upon the knowledge and the expertise of R&D 
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professionals and their rationalities. This has deep implications for the implicit agreement 
about the traditional “nature and culture of power” (Clegg et al. 2006, 335). While involving 
the project leaders in decision making processes might not affect top management’s status as 
founders and owners, it definitely will challenge segments of their authority that are based 
upon their business expertise. 
c) Changing the political form 
REDESIGNING THE PROCESS OF INNOVATION: A prominent and important measure is 
setting up an organization development process in co-operation with an external change agent 
to provide a well established bundle of methods and techniques. Common to all these 
workshops is a strong focus on socio-technical design tools aimed at refining and redesigning 
the governance of innovation processes. The shared focus on design tools appears to serve as 
an instrumental bracket at the level of concrete operations and routines, bringing together 
different actors in the political arena despite their lack of a common change vision. 
Within the last 15 months three OD-workshops have taken place, indicating the strong desire 
of owners, managers and professionals to foster innovation capability. These workshops 
focused on changes in authority structures and decision processes, innovation process 
refinements and radical product innovation techniques. Particularly the owners are pressing 
for more innovation output. They repeatedly expressed how proud they are of being 
independent from shareholder value driven short term profit maximization impertinencies. 
Their intention is to keep this independence and stay in control. In their view, innovation 
output and related changes in the political form of the company are means to these ends. 
DIFFERENT PRIORITIES: Different opinions exist about the concrete goals that have to be 
reached within the OD workshops. For middle managers and project managers one of the 
most pressing issues is the revision of task allocation, as their (especially the middle 
managers’) role within the organization is not very well defined. In the owner’s opinion, 
however, this should be the second step They argue that employees do not have the necessary 
business skills yet and that a clear definition of jobs would bring people to stick too closely to 
their defined tasks, not thinking “outside the box” any more. This argument, however, is not 
accepted among middle managers and R&D project managers. They argue that a few binding 
agreements would have a positive structuring effect on work coordinations, rather than 
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promote “thinking inside the box”. Again, the power paradox becomes obvious: ruling by rule 
inevitably also will commit the organizational top elite to the rules set. 
PROJECT CONTROLLING AND RELATED TOOLS: Mainly driven by middle managers, 
project managers and the external change agent, another concrete step within the OD process 
has been the implementation of project management tools intended to make decisions more 
transparent, observable and justifiable from the perspective of the different actors involved. 
One of these tools is constantly updated project sheets on each project, providing an executive 
summary of all relevant information on a project (project status, potential customers of the 
intended product, legal situation regarding IP, estimated costs, etc.). In keeping with our 
notion of reflexivity (e.g. Moldaschl 2006), this is a small but concrete change towards a more 
institutionalized reflexivity, fostering critical distancing from organizational practices and 
project rationalities. These project sheets are appreciated for different reasons by both top 
management and project leaders. 
The managing directors appreciate that project leaders are forced to collect all relevant 
information, which then can serve as the basis for further discussions and decision making in 
related meetings. Furthermore, the project sheets are considered a means of constraining 
project leaders’ autonomy and a guideline for project managers against the backdrop of their 
envisioned extended responsibility. Project sheets can thus be seen as both a means of 
delegating authority, measuring results and disciplining project leaders (disciplinary power, 
Foucault 1977; Miller and O’Leary 1987). 
Project leaders welcome the structuring and committing effects the project sheets have on 
actual project work and partially on the decisions made on the projects. To enhance the self-
committing effects on the managerial directors, they even suggested and pressed for 
obligatory countersignature of the project sheets by both project leader and managerial 
director in order to “be on the safe side”. 
Particularly this episode highlights that, while attempting to change the political form of the 
organization, the actors are currently running into the power paradox rooted in “ruling by 
rule” (e.g. Clegg et al. 2006). It also reveals that creating legitimacy for new rules depends on 
the compliance of both the subordinates (the ruled) and those who have the formal power to 
change rules (the ruler).  
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Wrapping up, the episodes depicted here show how fundamental the regime change process 
really is, emerging around the intersection of contested design changes, a crucial power 
paradox and the constitution of obedient yet creative subjects, (i.e. the intrapreneurial project 
leaders). 
All of the measures described can be interpreted as first steps of an evolutionary change 
process of the political form. The company is moving away from paternalistic-entrepreneurial 
forms of governing towards more decentralized forms, combining professional and collegial 
natures and cultures of power while not undermining the owners’ ultimate right to govern. 
However, this process is in no way straightforward. Rather, it seems to be highly tentative. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions  
The aim of this paper is to study emerging reflexive forms of power and authority, considered 
as regimes beyond pure domination (Clegg et al. 2006: 330 f.), that are conducive to 
innovation processes in high tech companies. In this context, reflexivity is considered as 
prerequisite for innovation, as means of overcoming potential rigidities of previous 
organizational capability building (Moldaschl 2006; Schreyögg and Kliesch-Eberl 2007). In 
particular, any means fostering deliberate, rule based (i.e., institutionalized) monitoring and 
critiquing of organizational first order routines and practices are considered as means of 
institutionalized reflexivity (Moldaschl 2006). In this sense, reflexivity is deemed being 
conducive to reflexive forms of power and authority within innovative organisations. 
We set out exploring the co-evolution of reflexive organizational regimes and innovations 
systems, proposing that processes bringing about reflexive political forms will be contested, 
antagonistic and paradoxical. 
Summing up, first insights from the case study unambiguously underline the relevance of our 
analytical perspective, focusing on the contested and contradictory character of the co-
evolutionary processes fostering reflexivity, innovation and conducive political regime. 
Contradictory “construction principles” (Dougherty 2008) are guiding the design processes 
towards a more reflexive innovation system in the company studied. The most important 
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findings from this study so far support the paradox-focused approach to exploring how a 
reflexive political form comes about. The actors permanently seem to be running into a 
fundamental power paradox (Clegg et al. 2006): “ruling by rule” is a means of domination 
and control for one side (owners) as well as of empowerment, discretion and resistance for the 
other side (managers, professionals). Struggles among the actors involved on how to change 
the innovation system of the company, have also revealed related contradictory construction 
principles, highlighting fundamentally conflicting interests in these processes. 
CONTESTED DESIGN PRINCIPLES AND POWER PARADOX: While agreeing on the 
need for more reflexive innovation systems, conflicts regarding the guiding design principles 
undermine the efforts to successfully implement it. Both owners and key managers from R&D 
have realized that enhancing innovation capability will certainly result in developing new 
authority structures. The interdependence between the two issues is clearly seen. 
Contrary to our initial assumption, keeping power processes as invisible as possible when 
turning the company towards more reflexive political forms is not a primary concern of power 
holders. In fact, a main barrier to more reflexive forms of power and innovation systems, are 
conflicts rooted in substituting impersonal rules of governing innovation processes for highly 
visible, personal supervision and power use. As changes in the innovation system towards 
more transparency, consistency and reflexivity unavoidably call into question established 
spheres of power, in particular the owners’ prerogative to  define the criteria how to separate 
‘good’ from ‘bad’ projects, the design principles and options are highly contested. The main 
confrontation with respect to redesigning the innovation system, its processes, and related 
tools persistently emerges between owners and R&D professionals acting as project leaders. It 
embodies the continuing struggle between different rationalities (Weber 1972, 1978) of 
governing and reasoning, more specifically, between substantive rationalities of R&D 
professionals and formal economic rationalities of the owners. Supporting Townley et al. 
(2003: 1064), our findings suggest that the tensions between these rationalities are “a 
continuing dialectic”, inseparable from power relations (Foucault 1977) and therefore 
simultaneously providing the social space for intervention and creative action, the “praxis” of 
actors in Bensons’ (1977) terms. 
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Within these power relations, when taking the perspective of the power elite (the company 
owners), project management tools are seen as means of disciplining R&D professionals and 
aligning them more with business needs. It is also meant as a means of “ruling by rule”, 
substituting for the personal supervision and control of innovation projects, being the 
traditional form of control in the company. Taking the perspective of R&D professionals, they 
partly agree with the owners’ intention to align project management with business needs. 
They also welcome the reflexive character of the instruments that are implemented, efficiently 
triggering second order observation, self-management and self-control. Hence, they do not 
principally resist the “regulation of identity” (Alvesson and Willmott 2002). The constitution 
of their subjects appear to be both creative and obedient. However, they also consider the 
project management instruments as means of protection against autocratic interventions of the 
owners. Taken seriously, the intended regime of numbers will subsume both project managers 
and owners. Therefore, the power paradox rooted in ruling by rule emerges. 
“LOCK IN” IN THE COMMON SENSE OF GOVERNING: In a way, the system of actors 
seems also to be locked in, virtually entrapped in their commonsense of governing (Barratt 
2008, 522) that has been learned, practiced and sustained over a period of over 10 years. On 
one hand, the above shown contradictions among rationalities and the pressure to radically 
innovate stimulates the creative reconstruction of social patterns of innovation behavior, to a 
certain extent, which can be seen, for example, in the OD workshops. On the other hand, 
however, the delimiting effects of the present social form become obvious in this very praxis, 
due to its embodied “know how” of practical reasoning (Townley 2002, 164 f.) and related 
power relations (power/knowledge-relations, Foucault 1977). Indicative in this respect are the 
persistent conflicts regarding the new project sheet. Owner and project managers alike 
welcome it as a new means of intrapreneurial development and reasoned project monitoring 
and control. Consistent with their past experiences in governing and being governed, actors 
also want to be “on the safe side”, thereby deliberately delimiting the social space for creating 
new patterns of behavior stimulating innovation processes. 
Although somewhat speculative, first findings of our case study also alert us to take in 
account the effects that threatening external contexts may have on self-sustaining (or self-
transcending) tendencies of organizational political forms (Courpasson 2006: 182 f.). While 
the market troubles in 2005, and the perceived threats and risks have stimulated and still 
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stimulate new praxis how to innovate, they also foster self-sustaining tendencies regarding 
paternalistic regime characteristics of the past (resembling a kind of threat-rigidity-circle, 
Staw et al. 1981). The well established commonsense of governing –members’ loyalty and 
acceptance of the owners’ dominance even in operational issues is deemed legitimate because 
the owners provide protection from market risks and secure workplaces- seemingly offers 
“safe” ways of controlling some of the vast risks rooted in the human medicine market entry. 
With respect to these self sustaining regime characteristics and the above shown paradoxes, 
the OD-workshops are a particularly useful means of planned irritation and second order 
observation (Argyris and Schön 1978), providing social space for reflecting upon and 
distancing from these self-sustaining regime patterns and paradoxes. The workshops actually 
provide a useful arena for changing the well established rules and behavioral patterns 
regarding the relations of knowing, meaning, acting and membership. In terms of “circuits of 
power” (Clegg 1989; Flyvbjerg 1998), our findings suggest that the workshops provide an 
arena for mobilizing support among actors willing to break the self-sustaining tendencies of 
extant power circuits. Currently the workshops appear to be the most appropriate arena to 
incubate facilitative power circuits. Indicative in this respect is the obligatory project sheet, an 
OD-workshop outcome, a small change with far reaching consequences. However, no context 
stands outside power (Foucault 1977). Underlining our initial assumption, analyses of the 
workshop interactions (e.g. the conflicts regarding agenda setting, regarding the binding 
effects of workshop outcomes) particularly show that social spaces providing room for 
reflexivity cannot be conceived of as separated from the organizational regime. They must be 
conceived of (and managed) as incorporated in the political regime within organizations, 
virtually being part of the power/knowledge web and related circuits of power.  
LEGITIMACY: After all, the findings suggest that the legitimacy of the current political form 
seems to be eroding in the long run. The persistency of a political form depends to a great 
extent on its perceived legitimacy. Legitimacy, in turn, roots in the persuasion that the 
prevalent distribution of power is “germane to a certain set of allegiance-generating values” 
(Clegg et al. 2006, 336; Courpasson 2006). The belief that this is the case has been prevalent  
to organizational sub elites, preserving them from market risks. As this seems to become more 
difficult, the traditional political form probably will not be able to persist in the long run. 
Without stating a causal determination the described efforts, which in official discourse are 
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presented as attempts to actively enhance innovation capability, can in this vein be interpreted 
as reaction to change pressure on the political form as well. 
LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUSION: The findings, their discussion and the conclusions 
must eventually be considered in light of its limitations. The study is subject to 
methodological limitations. As pointed out, the research is still at an early stage and confined 
to a single case. We have been very cautious so far with “prior instrumentation” 
(Miles/Huberman 1994:36) of the research process, so the data analysis leaves much room for 
interpretation open. In addition, our investigational focus is specifically concerned with the 
actors involved rather than with external situational factors and their effects. Regarding our 
theoretical approach so far, we suppose that the study will also benefit from linking it up more 
closely to critical theories of knowledge management (e.g. McKinlay 2005) and theories of 
organisation design and innovation (e.g. Dougherty 2008). In addition, reflections on 
reflexivity as means of organisation research might stimulate our conception of reflexivity in 
organizational contexts (Weick 1999; Alvesson et al. 2004). 
Nevertheless, we would like to point out some implications for theory building and research 
on reflexive organizational forms of power. Implications are more or less tentative due to the 
early stage of our research. One implication has to do with the deliberate development of 
political hybrids, considered here as political structures conducive to reflexivity and 
innovation, offering space to a great diversity of actors, while not disrupting the power of 
organizational elites (e.g. owners, top managers etc.) and their right to govern. We set out 
exploring the supposedly contested, paradoxical and designed character of related regime 
development, and the interrelations of these proposed characteristics with innovation process 
design, to the best of our knowledge a research desideratum both in the literature on power 
and the literature on innovation processes (e.g. Hage and Meeus 2006; Poole and Van De Ven 
2004; Vigoda-Gadot and Drory 2006; Clegg et al. 2006).  
Taken together, the case study findings so far support the relevance of our research 
perspective. Findings particularly shed light on the fact that contested innovation design 
rationalities, power relations, the power paradox rooted in ruling by rule and beliefs in the 
legitimacy of a specific political form are very closely intertwined. These interrelations, their 
intricacies, tensions and contradictions virtually make for the social space allowing the co-
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development of reflexive political forms and new innovation process design. Scholars have 
discussed some of these interrelations (e.g. Clegg 1989; Flyvbjerg 1998; Townley 2002, 
2003; Clegg et al. 2006:240 f.; 328 f.). In addition and more specifically, our findings point 
out that the intricate interrelations among all these facets make for the co-development of 
reflexive forms of power (hybrids) and innovation design processes. Particularly against the 
backdrop of an intended regime change from an oligarchic-entrepreneurial type towards a 
more reflexive hybrid type (Clegg et al. 2006:334), which combines different natures and 
cultures of power conducive to innovation capability and innovation outcome, these 
interrelations are certainly striking. In line with this, the research perspective taken here 
appears as a promising avenue for further theorizing about the characteristics shaping the 
emergence of reflexive political forms fostering innovation, with respect to a specific context 
(SME’s in high-tech markets).  
A second implication has to do with how political dynamics are (should be) considered in 
theories of dynamic capabilities, in particular with respect to their conceptions of second 
order observation and reflexivity (e.g. Zollo and Winter 2002; Schreyögg and Kliesch-Eberl 
2007). As mentioned in the beginning of this paper, the political context of second-order 
observation is principally acknowledged in this mainstream literature on dynamic capabilities. 
Reflexivity is seen as subject to political maneuvering and resistance, embedded in power 
structures that potentially ensure or weaken such reflexivity. However, based on our research 
results we argue for a more “pervasive” conception of power within the stream of dynamic 
capability research. More specifically, we suggest acknowledging that really no context stands 
outside power (Foucault 1977; Giddens 1984). Therefore, any rationality of second order 
observation is fused with power, affected by power and effects power. In this respect, 
organizations virtually are political regimes (Clegg et al. 2006; Courpasson 2006). All actors 
operate within existing structures of dominancy (Weber 1972, 1978) at any time, which 
provide the rules and resources to foster reflexivity and its practices (duality of structure, 
Giddens 1984). Taking this basic perspective a step further, our research results suggest that 
conceptions of power paradoxes and of continuing dialectics among different rationalities 
should become more important in the research streams concerned with dynamic capabilities, 
as well as conceptions of contradictions among different natures and cultures of power within 
political hybrids, to name a few.  
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Summing up, the case study shows how paradoxical it really is to develop a reflexive political 
regime conducive to innovation. Second-order observation, as prerequisite for reflexivity and 
innovation, is never free from interests, as any observation is observed by an interested actor. 
Scholars have argued that every social setting has its own politics of truth (e.g. Foucault 1980; 
Townley 2002; Alvesson et al. 2004). Analogously to this reasoning, when studying 
reflexivity in organizational contexts, and the design of reflexive innovation systems, 
respectively, we must carefully study the politics of reflexivity, particularly how power 
relations and related paradoxes as well as contested design principles and instruments favor a 
specific form of reflexivity. Otherwise, we will miss the point. 
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Appendix: Interviews and Participatory Observations  
(13 Feb 08 Kick-off meeting of research co-operation)  
22 May 08 Group interview (middle manager, support staff) 
27 Jun 08 Interview (Smith) 
6 Aug 08 Participatory observation in the laboratory 
17 Dec 08 Group interview (Smith, middle managers) 
23 Jan 09 Group interview (Smith, middle managers) 
27/28 Feb 09 Participatory observation of second OD workshop 
03 Mar 09 Group interview (middle managers, project managers) 
14-16 May 09 Participatory observation of third OD workshop 
 
 
